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Constraints on metalinguistic anaphora1 
Philippe De Brabanter 
Institut Jean Nicod, Université Paris 4-Sorbonne 
 
 
Just as it is possible to refer to any entity, concrete or abstract, in extralinguistic reality, it is 
also possible to refer to any linguistic entity, be that a phoneme, a word, a sentence, or any 
other linguistic object. Metalinguistic reference can be achieved in two ways, by means of 
‘autonymous’ and ‘heteronymous’ mention (cf. Recanati 2000: 137). Autonymous mention is 
a matter of quotation: a token of a linguistic string can be produced in order to refer to 
another token of that string or to a type which it instantiates: 
 
(1) “Boston” is disyllabic. (Quine 1940 :26) 
(2) She said “why don’t you just drop dead?” 
 
Heteronymous mention concerns all the non-quotational means that can be resorted to in 
order to refer metalinguistically, namely descriptions and various types of pronouns. 
 
(3) The 4354th word of Chants Democratic is disyllabic. (Quine 1940 :26) 
 
The central difference between autonymous and heteronymous mention is that the former 
rests on an iconic relation between the mentioning expression and its linguistic referent, 
whereas the latter involves no such resemblance at all. 
                                                
1 I am grateful to the editors for allowing me to submit this paper with a year’s delay. I also wish to thank two 
anonymous reviewers for their useful suggestions and for helping me improve the design of this paper. 
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The focus of this paper is on a subset of heteronymous mention, namely those cases in 
which the mentioning expression is, roughly speaking, anaphorically linked to the string it 
mentions. I will distinguish two subclasses. In the first one, the antecedent of the 
metalinguistic anaphor is a quotation. This means that both the antecedent and the anaphor 
refer to a linguistic entity (the same one, it turns out; these expressions are co-referential). In 
the second subclass, the antecedent is not a quotation; it is a string in ordinary use. Here we 
have no co-reference: whereas the anaphor refers metalinguistically, the antecedent either 
refers to an object in the world or does not refer at all. This second subclass is especially 
interesting because it instantiates a shift in the universe of discourse, from extralinguistic 
reality to language. Where such a shift occurs, I will speak of ‘world-to-language’ anaphora. 
I will argue that metalinguistic anaphora is best described in terms of a theory that 
assumes that various anaphoric expressions encode various degrees of salience of referents. 
But I will also show that salience is built in the context of utterance. It is not necessarily an 
acquired feature of the referent by the time the anaphor is processed: there is adjustment 
between the anaphor and its immediate linguistic environment. Besides, we will see that other 
factors may also affect anaphora resolution, which suggests that the best account must, in 
essence, be pragmatic. 
1. Formal varieties of metalinguistic anaphora 
I start with a couple of examples of ‘unshifted’ metalinguistic anaphora: 
 
(4) “Harry said ‘I didn’t do that’ but he said it in a funny way” 
(5)  “‘You are wrong’. That’s exactly what she said” 
 
Both examples are from Levinson, who writes about (4) that “it does not refer to the 
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proposition expressed but to Harry’s utterance itself” (2004: 103). Note that ‘I didn’t do that’, 
being a direct quotation, itself refers to Harry’s utterance. Thus, it and its antecedent are co-
referential and, in that respect (4) – like (5) – contains an ordinary case of anaphora. 
World-to-language anaphora is less well-behaved. There is no co-reference between the 
antecedent and the anaphor, in which respect world-to-language anaphora belongs with 
bridging (cf. Clark 1977). There is, however, a major difference between bridging and 
metalinguistic anaphora: in all varieties of bridging that I am aware of, there are strong 
constraints on the linguistic form of the antecedent and of the anaphor. Thus, to mention two 
examples, Kleiber’s (1999) ‘associative anaphors’ must be definite NPs with an NP-
antecedent, and Erkü and Gundel’s (1987) ‘indirect anaphors’ must be non-pronominal NPs 
whose antecedent quantifies over individuals, events, situations and facts. As we will see 
shortly, there are no such constraints on world-to-language anaphora: the antecedent merely 
needs to have been uttered (not too long before processing of the anaphor – this is a minimal 
temporal or spatial constraint) and the anaphor can, at first blush, be an indefinite NP, a 
definite NP, a demonstrative NP or pronoun, a relative or interrogative pronoun, and even an 
unstressed personal pronoun. Here are illustrations of each of these cases:  
 
(6) They genuinely tried to become, to use a horrid word, acculturated with the white 
invaders, even if they had no desire to be assimilated. (BNC AJV 758) 
(7) I still remember the day, before he was repatriated (Ray explained the meaning of 
the word to me very carefully) back to Paris by the French Government for 
treatment […]. 
 (www.brain.riken.go.jp/bsi-news/bsinews18/no18/networke.html) 
(8) A: I think of him as a family man. 
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  B: Funny, I’ve always considered that phrase an oxymoron. (Julian Barnes 1998, 
England, England, Picador, p. 64) 
(9) ‘Yeah, you’re all right. But you’re not perfect, and you’re certainly not happy. So 
what happens if you get happy, and yes I know that’s the title of an Elvis Costello 
album, I used the reference deliberately […]’. (Nick Hornby 1995, High Fidelity, 
Indigo, p. 223) 
(10) Yes, everything went swimmingly, which is a very peculiar adverb to apply to a 
social event, considering how most human beings swim. (Julian Barnes, Love, etc., 
Picador, pp. 70-71) 
(11) It means nothing to you, I suppose, he said, it was just a, what do they call it, a 
one-night-stand. (David Lodge, Nice Work, Penguin, p. 297) 
(12) After several hours of bouncing from one bureaucrat (notice it’s a French word) to 
another I was allowed into the hallowed chambers. (www.vt-fcgs.org/miscinfo.html) 
 
In all these instances, there is a strong connection between a heteronymously mentioning 
expression (‘heteronym’, for short)2 and some string occurring in the co-text. To that extent 
the strings in question can be regarded as antecedents. I wish to argue, however, that 
indefinite NPs are different and are not in fact anaphors. The metalinguistic NP in (6), a 
horrid word, occurs as part of an elliptical parenthetical clause. When completed, that clause 
is something like I am going to use a horrid word, and it has truth-conditions to the effect 
that the speaker has to use a horrid word. There is no constraint on which horrid word should 
be used: the word acculturated is not part of the truth-conditions of the parenthetical. In other 
words, the heteronym does not substitute anaphorically for its ‘antecedent’. Actually, this is 
the conclusion one is led to every time an indefinite NP is used metalinguistically. Here are 
                                                
2 The boldtype for the heteronyms is an addition of mine. 
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two more examples: 
 
(13) The copper-haired woman, meanwhile, had almost canceled a Hawaii trip because 
of fear of terrorists (a word she pronounced with two syllables, like Laura Bush), 
[…]. (starbulletin.com/2002/02/17/travel/story2.html) 
(14) And as the books about Peter Cook state, he was heavily influenced by the satirical 
nightclubs (always an odd phrase, to my mind) of France and Germany. 
 (groups.yahoo.com/group/peter_cook/message/4052). 
 
Here again the indefinite metalinguistic NPs occur in elliptical parentheticals. In the fleshed 
out clauses (This is a word which she pronounced with two syllables and This is always an 
odd phrase, to my mind), the indefinites do not refer to the strings terrorists and satirical 
nightclubs. This is all the clearer here because those clauses do include heteronymous 
anaphors to these expressions: the demonstrative pronouns that have been filled in. It is those 
demonstratives, not the indefinite metalinguistic NPs that contribute the strings terrorists and 
satirical nightclubs to the truth-conditions of the fleshed out clauses. 
Things are significantly different in all of the other examples (7-12). There, the 
heteronym is necessarily interpreted in terms of the antecedent. For instance, what that 
phrase contributes to the truth-conditions in (8) is the expression family man and what which 
contributes to the truth-conditions in (10) is the word swimmingly. Therefore, in the rest of 
this paper, I will exclude examples like (6), (13) and (14) from the study of metalinguistic 
anaphora. 
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2. Constraints on the antecedent and referent of the antecedent 
We have just seen that the form of metalinguistic anaphors is relatively unconstrained. But 
are there perhaps stronger constraints on the sort of antecedent that these anaphors can take, 
or on the referent of the antecedent? First, what few constraints there are on the antecedents 
are not very severe: the antecedent must (i) be a linguistic expression and (ii) be close to the 
world-to-language anaphor.3 As for the referent of the antecedent, there are no restrictions on 
it … because there is not even a requirement that the antecedent should have a referent. Take 
(7) and (9) again: neither repatriated nor get happy, which are the respective antecedents of 
the word and of that, have a referent. This does not prevent these expressions from 
functioning as antecedents of the anaphors. 
3. A top-down approach 
The above observations mean that there is little sense in working out a bottom-up account 
based on the sorts of forms that enter into metalinguistic anaphora. It makes better sense to 
approach it top-down, starting from a general cognitive or pragmatic principle. There are at 
least two theories in the literature that attempt to ground anaphora resolution on a cognitive 
principle. One is Mira Ariel’s ‘Accessibility Theory’ (1988, 1991), the other Gundel et al.’s 
‘Givenness Hierarchy’ (1993, 2003; Borthen et al. 1997). Both share the view that different 
types of grammatical forms or constructions (personal or demonstrative pronouns, definite 
descriptions, etc.) encode different degrees of salience4 of referents. In other words, the 
                                                
3 How close is an important question that I cannot answer now. Some work in psycholinguistics provides 
pointers, however. Levelt (1989: 122) writes that it is likely that “in conversation, literal recall not supported by 
salient content or pragmatic significance is short-lived, probably going back only as far as the last clause 
uttered”. Note too that what in (11) precedes its ‘antecedent’, indicating at least that the antecedent need not 
always come immediately before the anaphor (which some would therefore call a cataphor. Still, I will follow a 
widely accepted tradition (see e.g. Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 1455) and use anaphor regardless of the position 
of the antecedent). 
4 Other possible terms here include accessibility and activation. However, for the sake of convenience, I will use 
salience throughout. 
 7 
required degree of salience of a referent is part and parcel of the lexical meaning of referring 
expressions in general and anaphors in particular. 
In the following, I will refer mainly to the Givenness Hierarchy, though the discussion 
could be extended to Ariel’s Accessibility Theory.5 The Givenness Hierarchy relies on the 
notion that the choice of an anaphoric form reflects the speaker’s assumptions about how 
salient the referent of the antecedent is to the hearer (how easily recoverable it is). Gundel et 
al. distinguish six levels pairing a ‘cognitive status’ with linguistic forms. I illustrate levels 3 
to 6, the other two being irrelevant to my present purposes as they are not available in 
metalinguistic anaphora. 
As one moves up the hierarchy, one encounters forms that place increasing constraints on 
the cognitive status of the referent: 
 
(15) [lev 3] Steve’s car let him down yesterday. The battery was dead. 
(16) [lev 4] Steve’s car let him down yesterday. That battery was dead. 
(17) [lev 5] ??Steve’s car let him down yesterday. That was dead. 
(18) [lev 6] ??Steve’s car let him down yesterday. It was dead. 
 
(15) is a basic instance of bridging. All that is required for the referent of the battery to be 
accessed is that it be ‘uniquely identifiable’ by the hearer. It must be recoverable as a distinct 
object in the context of utterance, but need not have been represented in the hearer’s mind to 
begin with. The only condition is possession of a mental frame specifying that cars have 
batteries. For (16) to be acceptable, we need something more: the referent must be ‘familiar’ 
to the hearer, i.e. represented in his long-term memory. The only way to interpret that battery 
here is as that battery we’ve already talked about or some such phrase. As for (17) and (18), 
                                                
5 Ariel views accessibility as a property of the mental representations of referents, rather than of referents 
themselves. But that difference has no impact that I can see on the account given here. 
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it is very unlikely that they license the intended interpretation, i.e. that on which the anaphor 
refers to the battery in Steve’s car. According to Gundel et al., that would be because the 
previous co-text is insufficient to enable the battery to be ‘activated’ (i.e. placed in short-term 
memory) at level 5 or ‘in focus’ at level 6 (i.e. “at the current center of attention”, among the 
“entities which are likely to be continued as topics of subsequent utterances” (Gundel et al., 
1993: 279)). 
The cognitive constraints on the highest level in the hierarchy are quite severe. Thus, 
Gundel et al. have shown that even explicit mention does not guarantee in-focus status. 
Consider the next pair of examples (assume that they are uttered with the same unmarked 
intonation): 
 
(19) I’ve just bought a parrot from Peru. It’s a wonderful bird. 
(20) ?? I’ve just bought a parrot from Peru. It’s a wonderful country. 
 
After the first sentence in (19) has been processed, the parrot from Peru is in focus because 
the phrase mentioning it occurs as a direct object of bought, a position which, like the subject 
position, is capable of bringing a referent into focus. By contrast, (20) is less clearly 
acceptable (or requires an enriched context, in which, for example, Peru was the topic before 
(20) was uttered, or in which Peru is given prosodic prominence). Reduced acceptability 
stems from the fact that Peru occurs in a prepositional phrase modifying the head of the 
direct-object NP, a syntactic position that is not in itself sufficient to bring a referent into 
focus. 
4. What endows linguistic referents with the required level of salience? 
In this section, we need a strict distinction between world-to-language and unshifted 
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metalinguistic anaphora. In the latter case, it may be assumed that the linguistic referent 
derives its salience from being mentioned. Take: 
 
(21) The term “berber,” while still used by some, is problematic. The term is of Greek 
derivation, meaning “foreigner” or “non-Greek speaker.” 
(www.amazighworld.org/communication/who/abouttheportal.php) 
 
The occurrence of The term in bold face is anaphoric: it is to be interpreted in terms of the 
previous occurrence of (The term) “berber”. Here anaphora resolution seems a 
straightforward affair since the antecedent has metalinguistic reference and already mentions 
the referent of the anaphor. 
World-to-language anaphors are a different kettle of fish, precisely because the domain of 
reference shifts between the antecedent and the anaphor. In (7) to (12), the metalinguistic 
anaphors have antecedents that are not mentioned but in ordinary use. How come they are 
available at all for anaphora? 
The question becomes all the more pressing when one realises that even unstressed 
personal pronouns can occur as world-to-language anaphors. As Ariel states, the speaker who 
uses an anaphoric personal pronoun assumes that the mental representation to be retrieved is 
highly accessible (1988: 77, 1991: 449). We saw above that Gundel et al. make a similar 
claim. In a recent contribution (2003: 284), Gundel, with other collaborators, goes so far as to 
say that “[…] unstressed personal pronouns, including it, are appropriately used only when 
the referent can be assumed to be in focus for the addressee prior to processing of the 
referring form” (italics mine).6 
                                                
6 A very similar position is expressed in Cornish (1999: 6). 
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If these claims are correct, the prediction is that any unstressed personal pronoun 
occurring as a successfully interpretable world-to-language anaphor signals that its referent 
(some linguistic entity) was already in focus. This must be the case in sentence (12), repeated 
below, as well as in (22): 
 
(12)  After several hours of bouncing from one bureaucrat (notice it’s a French word) to 
another I was allowed into the hallowed chambers. 
(22) This grinder uses a dead man switch to activate the grinder. It’s what we call it 
because as soon as you release pressure the switch turns off. 
(www.wholelattelove.com/buyingguide.cfm?buyingguideID=4) 
 
I gather that these utterances are not especially difficult to interpret, that anaphora resolution 
takes place quite smoothly and that ordinary hearers/readers would not notice anything 
special going on. None the less, it is a fact that, in (12) and (22), it heteronymously refers to a 
linguistic entity about which nothing has been said in the previous context. Nor, for that 
matter, have the expressions dead man switch and bureaucrat been brought into special 
prominence, one way or another (e.g. by scare quotes in writing, by prosody in speech). 
It may seem then that all it takes for dead man switch and bureaucrat to be in focus (i.e. 
available for reference by means of it) is for these words to have been uttered, i.e. to have 
been made perceptible in the preceding co-text. This in itself is an intriguing proposal. But 
there is more: the entities that are made manifest in the co-text are not the actual referents of 
the two occurrences of it: these anaphors refer to expression-types, not to the particular 
tokens occurring in an utterance of (12) or (22). It is to these expressions as types (here, as 
lexical items) that the predicates call and French word apply. 
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To sum up, we are faced with two main questions. First, there is a question that concerns 
all instances of world-to-language anaphora: How come those linguistic entities are available 
for reference at all? This issue needs to be addressed regardless of which anaphoric 
expression is used. Second, we need to ask how those linguistic entities can sometimes be so 
highly activated that they are felicitously picked up by cognitively demanding anaphors, 
notably by unstressed personal pronouns. While trying to answer these questions, especially 
the second one, I will have to say something about how salience is built in the context of a 
discourse. 
4.1 What enables those linguistic entities to function as referents? 
A plausible answer to that question can be found in a 1998 paper on quotation by Paul Saka. 
There, the author puts forward a ‘multiple ostension’ hypothesis according to which any 
expression used in a spoken utterance ‘directly ostends’ a phonetic token (say /dʒɒn/) and 
‘de d ferringly ostends’ a number of other features or entities: when I utter the word John, I 
explicitly refer to John (that is part of what I say), but I also ‘activate’ (via the phonetic 
token) the corresponding form type, the lexeme <John, /dʒɒn/, proper noun, JOHN>, the 
concept JOHN (see Saka 1998: 126). 
I think Saka’s hypothesis is sound. Therefore, I assume that the result of uttering any 
expression is that various linguistic aspects of it become objects of the context of utterance 
(of the universe of discourse) endowed with at least a minimal degree of salience. These 
objects then are potential targets for subsequent referential expressions because the 
hearer/reader is at least minimally alert to them as the discourse unfolds. 
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4.2 What brings linguistic entities into focus? 
As far as I can see, in world-to-language anaphora, the linguistic referent (an expression-type, 
a lexeme, a meaning) possesses no other salience than that which it acquires indirectly from 
the uttering of an associated expression-token. That is all the salience it has prior to the 
moment when a subsequent world-to-language anaphor is processed. 
This, at least, holds for cases where no specific intonation pattern or typographical 
markers have been used. I return to these highlighting devices shortly, but for the moment I 
rest satisfied with the claim that the antecedents in (12) and (22) can all be uttered neutrally 
and still be recoverable as antecedents of metalinguistic anaphors. I assume that most of my 
readers had no trouble arriving at the correct interpretation for these utterances, even though 
the antecedents were not highlighted in any way. 
Now, if Saka’s story accounts for all the salience of the relevant linguistic referents, then 
it must also singlehandedly account for the level of activation of these referents. Thus, with 
respect to cases like (12) and (22), where in-focus status is required, the theory in Gundel et 
al. (2003) predicts that multiple ostension (or some similar story) adequately explains how 
that demanding cognitive status is achieved here. Yet, this prediction cannot be right, for 
several reasons. First, we saw earlier (examples 19, 20) that the explicit mention of a referent 
may not suffice to bring it into focus. One has reason to doubt that mere deferred ostension 
will succeed where even explicit mention may fail. Second, it is not sensible to assume that 
the exact same event (some words have been uttered) can lead to such different outcomes as 
the following: making a referent ‘uniquely identifiable’ (when the anaphor is a definite NP), 
placing it in short-term memory (demonstrative pronouns), or bringing it into focus 
(unstressed pronouns). Third, and probably worst of all, Gundel et al’s prediction would seem 
to have an absurd consequence: since all (the entities associated with) the tokens uttered prior 
to the anaphor in (12) or (22) are ostended to the same extent (as a direct result of being 
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uttered), this must mean that they are all in focus (for at least some period of time). Clearly, 
this is an undesirable conclusion.7 
So Saka’s story cannot be all there is to the salience of bureaucrat in (12) and dead man 
switch in (22). But since the multiple ostension hypothesis is all we have to explain what 
happens to the left of the anaphor, we must look for an explanation to its right. This 
explanation is disappointingly straightforward: it lies in the combination of the anaphor with 
a metalinguistic predicate. Try replacing that predicate with a neutral one that applies equally 
well to linguistic and non-linguistic objects, and the anaphor can now hardly be interpreted as 
a case of heteronymous mention: 
 
(23) I was attacked by Zonkins. 
a. It’s a strange word. 
b. How do you spell it? 
c. It’s strange, isn’t it? 
d. How do you like it? 
(24) This grinder uses a dead man switch to activate the grinder. It’s funny, isn’t it? 
(25) After several hours of bouncing from one bureaucrat (notice it’s French) to another 
I was allowed into the hallowed chambers. 
 
Whereas, in (23a-b), it is naturally construed as referring to the name Zonkins, it can hardly 
be understood to do so in (23c-d). Yet, the predicates strange and like do not bar the 
metalinguistic interpretation, since they are neutral with respect to a world-oriented or 
language-oriented reading. In (24), it is now very unlikely to be interpreted as referring to the 
phrase dead man switch. (25), it appears, is different. The preferred interpretation for it seems 
                                                
7 As a reviewer notes, the three reasons given may be no more than different ways of identifying a single cause: 
the fact that the degree of salience of a referent can still change after the occurrence of the expression that 
makes that referent available. See below. 
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to be heteronymous mention. Some members of the audience at the 2005 Dortmund 
conference on Constraints in Discourse suggested that French might be more ‘language-
biased’ than the other alleged neutral predicates. That may be so. But note that, in the absence 
of additional contextual information, an utterance of Champagne is French is ambiguous 
between a world-oriented and a language-oriented reading (with a preference for the former). 
This casts doubt on that explanation. My feeling is rather that the heteronymous reading is 
facilitated by the occurrence of it in the parenthetical clause notice it’s French, which 
intrudes at an arbitrary spot in the sentence structure: in this case, it splits a place adjunct into 
two fragments, thereby disrupting the humdrum flow of information and introducing a new 
topic. This intrusion may draw attention to the words to its immediate left, one of which is 
indeed French, increasing the likelihood that it is going to be rightly interpreted as shifting 
reference from the world to language.8 
The facts about metalinguistic predicates in (23)-(25) suggest that givenness, in the strict 
sense, is inadequate to explain world-to-language anaphors. The same applies to accessibility 
understood strictly as prior accessibility. Most likely, in (23)-(25), the referent is not in focus 
before the occurrence of anaphoric it. Here, therefore, is my preferred account of what goes 
on: 
the anaphor, being an anaphor, triggers a presupposition that its referent has already been 
introduced into the discourse. The presupposition initiates a search for this referent. 
Processing of the metalinguistic predicate then helps direct the addressee’s attention to 
linguistic entities. That way, a linguistic referent is brought into focus. 
                                                
8 At this stage, these are only sketchy and speculative remarks that need substantiating. But a proper study of the 
role of parentheticals would take me too far afield. 
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5. Role of the predicate elsewhere 
The previous discussion has shown that givenness (or accessibility) cannot in and of itself 
explain how pronominal metalinguistic anaphors select their referent. I have suggested that, 
in order to account for the pronoun’s ability to pick out a linguistic referent, it is necessary to 
look to the right and consider the metalinguistic predicate. My main aim has been to show the 
inadequacy of givenness/accessibility as a unique explanatory factor. In section 7, I outline a 
general framework for anaphora resolution that takes account of the contributions of 
givenness/accessibility and of the predicate with which the anaphor combines, but also allows 
for other factors. In the meantime, however, I wish to look further into the role of the 
metalinguistic predicate. 
It is striking that neither of the theories I have appealed to has anything to say about the 
lexical contribution of the predicate governing the anaphor, or, more generally, about the 
contribution of the co-text to the right of the anaphor. However, the they might be justified in 
neglecting the right-hand co-text provided, simply, that the predicate barely played a role in 
the sorts of anaphora that they were considering (i.e. outside world-to-language anaphora). 
But that is just not true. In a study of referents introduced by clauses rather than NPs, 
Gundel et al. do treat the predicate as a determining factor. Still, they do so only implicitly: 
 
(26) a. John insulted the ambassador. It happened at noon. 
 b. John insulted the ambassador. ??It was intolerable. (cf. Gundel et al. 2003: 285) 
 
The claim here is that some clausally introduced entities license subsequent reference by 
means of it while others do not. Thus, if the entity in question is an event, it should be usable, 
whereas if the entity is a situation (or ‘fact’, in some terminologies), it should be dispreferred 
and, for instance, replaced by that. Variation in the acceptability of anaphoric it means that 
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described events are more highly activated than described situations. In the case at hand, if 
John insulted the ambassador introduces a situation rather than an event, then it is more 
difficult to refer to this situation by means of the personal pronoun it. 
The problem is that, by the time John insulted the ambassador has been processed, it is 
still an open question whether that sentence denotes an event or a situation. This, by the same 
token, also means that the degree of salience of the described entity is not fixed yet. Not until 
the predicate of the following sentence has been processed can the first sentence be said to 
denote an event or a situation. Thus, (26a) is construed as an event because of the subsequent 
occurrence of happened. Similarly, interpretation of intolerable in (26b) turns John’s 
insulting the ambassador into a situation. In ‘salience-talk’, we are induced to say that the 
degree of salience of the entity introduced by John insulted the ambassador cannot be 
determined until happened or intolerable have been processed. In particular, it appears that 
the in-focus status of the event of John’s insulting the ambassador depends in part on the 
occurrence of the verb happened in the right-hand co-text. 
These examples show that the influence of predicates on the salience of their anaphoric 
arguments extends beyond world-to-language anaphora. But, as I said, it is striking that 
Gundel et al., though their analyses implicitly acknowledge this, do not point out the role of 
the predicates to the right of anaphors. Neither, for that matter, does Ariel in the papers 
mentioned earlier. 
6. Robustness of the proposed account 
One way of testing the role played by the metalinguistic predicate is to check what happens 
when the salience of the linguistic referents is enhanced by means other than a metalinguistic 
predicate. 
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I hinted above that antecedents could be highlighted in such a way as to attract hearers’ 
attention to them qua expressions. However, the following set of examples suggests that such 
highlighting is not enough to endow a linguistic referent with the required degree of salience: 
 
(27) I was attacked by ‘Zonkins’. 
a. It’s strange, isn’t it? 
b. How do you like it? 
(28) This grinder uses a dead man switch to activate the grinder. It’s funny, isn’t it? 
 
Even if the scare quotes or italics are realised prosodically as very emphatic stress, it is 
unclear that construal of it as a heteronym is facilitated. 
Some further evidence for the role of the metalinguistic predicate comes from ‘the other 
half’ of metalinguistic anaphora, i.e. the ‘unshifted’ cases. Consider what happens to (29) if 
the metalinguistic predicate is replaced with a neutral one: 
 
(29) “We’re in a forest, with spiders and who knows what other yuckies…” this she 
said as she wrinkled her nose. (www.ofelvesandmen.com/Stories/D/Di-and-
LK/RoadTrip2-3.htm) 
(30)  “We’re in a forest, with spiders and who knows what other yuckies…” 
 a) this she hated, so she wrinkled her nose. 
 b) that was pretty bad.9 
 
In (29) and (30), the linguistic referent – the female character’s utterance – is mentioned by 
means of the direct quotation. Yet, once again, it appears that without a metalinguistic 
                                                
9 The predicates hate and be pretty bad are neutral in the sense that they can apply to linguistic entities just as 
well as they do to extralinguistic ones. (cf. the predicates used in (23)-(25)) 
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predicate the heteronymous interpretation of the anaphor is hardly available. Notice moreover 
that we are dealing with demonstrative pronouns, i.e. less cognitively demanding forms than 
personal pronouns, requiring only that the referent be activated (30a) or familiar (30b), 
according to Gundel et al. (1993). Yet, even though the referent is mentioned explicitly, and 
the anaphoric forms demand less salience, the intended interpretation cannot be readily 
accessed. 
Things, however, are not as clear-cut as with world-to-language anaphors. Take example 
(21) again and consider what happens if a pronoun is substituted for the definite NP and a 
neutral predicate for the metalinguistic one: 
 
(21)  The term “berber,” while still used by some, is problematic. The term is of Greek 
derivation, meaning “foreigner” or “non-Greek speaker.” 
(31) The term “berber,” while still used by some, is problematic. It is strange/We don’t 
like it. 
 
Here, it seems that something like default assumptions about topic continuity ensure that it is 
going to be interpreted correctly as a heteronym. Alternatively, the presence of the 
introductory predicate the term in the antecedent sentence may affect the availability of the 
heteronymous interpretation of it in (31). Note also that if this or that were used instead of it, 
the metalinguistic interpretation would not be secured. That can probably be explained by 
(something like) Grice’s maxim of quantity: if a more cognitively demanding form can be 
used, then a less demanding one cannot be used without a special reason: a plausible 
candidate here is topic change. Clearly, further work needs to be done on the factors that 
affect the availability of a metalinguistic interpretation for an unshifted anaphor. But this 
goes beyond the scope of the present study. 
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7. Plausible explanations 
In this section, I will extend the argument that prior accessibility or salience cannot be the 
sole explanatory factor for metalinguistic anaphora resolution. In 7.1 and 7.2 I discuss two 
more factors that may play a part, the lexical meaning of the antecedent, and the possibility 
that some linguistic referents are inherently more salient than others. The conclusion I am led 
to is that all these factors need to be brought together into a general framework, something 
along the lines of Recanati (2004). This is not incompatible with Gundel et al. and Ariel. 
Instead, it is to be seen as an extension of their theories, one that further develops the notion 
that anaphora resolution is primarily a pragmatic affair. 
The story so far offers an explanation for why a referent can be made salient enough. But 
it does not say how a particular, non-random referent is picked out. Access to the referent is 
provided via identification of the right antecedent, but how is this antecedent selected? 
7.1 The lexical meaning of the antecedent 
First, there are instances in which the lexical meanings of both the antecedent and the 
metalinguistic predicate play a major part. Take (8) again: 
 
(8) A: I think of him as a family man. 
 B: Funny, I’ve always considered that phrase an oxymoron. 
 
Since an oxymoron is predicated of that phrase, the latter NP must refer to something that 
can be judged to be both a phrase and an oxymoron. Therefore, the antecedent must (i) be a 
complex phrase and (ii) denote two properties that can, in a given context, be interpreted as 
incompatible. Only an antecedent whose lexical meaning is consistent with that of the 
predicate will be selected. If there is no more than one such antecedent – here, there is only 
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family man – then anaphora resolution is straightforward. In any case, all words or phrases 
whose meaning did not match that of the predicate would already have been eliminated. 
However, the match between lexical meanings does not systematically play a part in 
anaphora resolution. Thus, in (9), this explanation is entirely unavailable, because the 
metalinguistic predicate, title of an Elvis Costello album, does not favour any particular 
antecedent: only a fully context-based, pragmatic, explanation can do the job. The fact that 
the antecedent of that is get happy, rather than the italicised get or happy is entirely a matter 
of world knowledge. Anyone unfamiliar with the Elvis Costello catalogue would be unable to 
pick out the right referent. 
7.2 Inherent salience of certain words or phrases 
In discussion, there have been suggestions that some antecedents inherently stand out. Take 
rare words, like swimmingly in (10), or long ones like repatriated in (7). I do not deny that 
rare or unusually long words tend to attract the addressee’s attention. Some psycholinguists at 
least have argued that different words have different activation thresholds (cf. ‘the frequency 
effect’; see Garman 1991: 279-81 or Harley 1995: 71-73). All the same, words are not 
inherently salient, and the ‘lexical oddity’ thesis therefore falls short of being a satisfactory 
explanation. High salience is not part and parcel of a lexeme, it is context-sensitive. Two 
quick examples: specialised, technical words tend to be rare words. This means that they are 
likely to attract attention when used in an everyday conversational context. Yet, when used in 
a specialised one, these terms will not be particularly salient. Or consider the fact that even 
the most ordinary words can become highly salient, provided they are uttered in the right 
context. Thus the word baby heard by a man who is about to become a father. 
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7.3 A general pragmatic framework 
The factors that have so far been shown to play some part in the resolution of metalinguistic 
anaphora are: 
• the accessibility of the linguistic referents 
• a constraint on the distance between antecedent and anaphor (end of section 2) 
• the match between the lexical meaning of the antecedent and the predicate 
with which the anaphor combines (or which is included in the anaphor, in the 
case of definite and demonstrative NPs) 
• unequal threshold levels of contextual salience 
All these factors are potentially relevant, and they need to be integrated into a general 
framework. This framework must be essentially pragmatic, as it appears that no single 
parameter can account for metalinguistic anaphora resolution: although some factors 
(distance, for instance) probably play a role in all cases of resolution, it is usually a cluster of 
factors that combine to help identify the right antecedent and select the corresponding 
referent. And which factors are relevant appears to be context-dependent. 
Let us once again focus on pronominal world-to-language anaphors. What happens when 
a hearer/reader comes across the anaphors in utterances like (9)-(12) or (22)? It is very likely 
that the hearer/reader will not immediately ascribe to these a linguistic referent. On the 
contrary, he is likely at first to have in mind an ordinary extralinguistic referent. That is 
because nothing in the co-text up to that point has particularly activated any linguistic 
entities. Thus, in (9), he would probably expect that to refer to the event of getting happy (cf. 
So what happens if you get happy, and yes I know that’s not likely to happen soon). Similarly, 
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in (10), the default interpretation for which is likely to be the fact that everything went 
swimmingly (cf. Yes, everything went swimmingly, which was rather a surprise).10 
At this stage, two stories are, I think, conceivable. On the first, a costly ‘repair’ procedure 
is assumed to take place: the pronominal anaphor’s default interpretation enters into semantic 
composition with the interpretation of the metalinguistic predicate. This yields an absurd 
interpretation for the whole clause (something to the effect that “the event of getting happy is 
the title of an Elvis Costello album” or that “the fact that everything went swimmingly is a 
peculiar adverb”). The absurdity of this result then induces the hearer/reader to backtrack and 
re-interpret the pronoun as having metalinguistic reference. Only on this second attempt does 
the hearer/reader come up with an acceptable interpretation for the whole clause. 
The second account does not assume such a cognitively costly procedure. Here, the idea 
is that the extralinguistic interpretation of the anaphor does not undergo composition: it is 
‘entertained’ only until the hearer/reader encounters the metalinguistic predicate, at which 
stage it is superseded by the metalinguistic reading. The assumption is that this reading was 
already activated ‘by association’: as soon as words are uttered, they (or their related types) 
are endowed with a minimal degree of activation – this is the gist of Saka’s hypothesis. 
Therefore, what happens is that the linguistic referent enters directly into semantic 
composition with the metalinguistic predicate: there is no cancellation of an initial, primary 
interpretation of the whole clause. The first time the whole clause is interpreted, it is qua 
referring to a linguistic entity.11 
The second account is essentially that given for figurative language by François Recanati 
in his Literal Meaning (2004: 27-30). Recanati rejects a dominant ‘Gricean’ model according 
                                                
10 That there has been no particular previous activation of a linguistic-entity-as-referent is patently true, of 
course, when the anaphor precedes its antecedent, as in example (11). 
11 This paragraph is a follow-up on a comment made by Rachel Giora (p.c.). Giora suggested that my account 
would predict garden-path effects in cases of world-to-language anaphora, adding that such effects could be 
tested empirically. I have not had the opportunity to do this, but I think that my account leaves open the 
possibility that world-to-language anaphors are not garden-path sentences, that some adjustment of anaphor and 
predicate takes place ‘locally’ before the whole sentence is processed. 
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to which an absurd literal interpretation for the whole utterance is processed first, then 
discarded because it fails to comply with some conversational maxim, thus triggering a repair 
procedure by means of conversational implicatures. Recanati outlines a different story, one 
that makes allowances for ‘primary pragmatic processes’, i.e. associative processes by which 
the meaning of local (subclausal) constituents is adjusted before undergoing semantic 
composition. 
Interestingly, Recanati then shows how this model can be extended to the selection of a 
referent for an anaphoric pronoun (2004: 31-32) and explicitly underlines the role that 
processing of the predicate plays in affecting the accessibility of the candidate referents 
(2004: 31, 33). My account of world-to-language anaphora is in the same spirit. In particular, 
I take it that the processes involved in interpreting pronominal anaphors are cognitively the 
same as those described by Recanati: they are associative rather than properly inferential; 
they apply locally rather than to the whole utterance. However, the analogy is perhaps only 
partial. The processes described by Recanati are not ‘pre-semantic’; they are not part of the 
processes that lead to determining ‘which sentence was uttered’. By contrast, it is reasonable 
to hold that choosing between an ordinary and a metalinguistic reading of a pronoun may be 
a facet of disambiguation. Assume I say I love Chicago!. I may mean the proper name to 
refer to a variety of objects, notably a city, a word (e.g. if I like the pronunciation), but also a 
musical, a band, etc. It seems to me at least that the sentence about the city is a different 
sentence from the one that refers to the word. If that is correct, selection between an object-
level and a meta-level referent for Chicago is part of disambiguation. And if, as seems 
sensible, one extends this analysis to all cases in which a linguistic referent competes with an 
extralinguistic one, there is a genuine difference between my account and Recanati’s. 
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8. Binding or accommodation? 
I believe the story told so far can be reformulated in terms of dynamic models of discourse 
such as DRT. The cognitive constraints associated with the use of anaphors can be cashed out 
in terms of presupposition. On this view, use of anaphoric this, for example, triggers the 
presupposition that, say, the referent must be present in short-term memory. And, even if it 
turned out that metalinguistic anaphors are really demonstrative deictics, this could be 
captured in presuppositional terms as well.12 Use of indexical this would trigger the 
presupposition that the speaker is demonstrating (e.g. pointing at) the relevant referent. On 
theories like those set out in Geurts (1998) and Beaver & Zeevat (2007) the presuppositions 
triggered by anaphors and demonstratives13 can either be ‘bound’ to an antecedent (by which 
the relevant referent has been previously introduced into the discourse and is therefore part of 
the ‘common ground’), or ‘accommodated’ (see below). If neither happens, presupposition 
failure occurs and communication is unsuccessful.  
In my examples, there can be no talk of presupposition failure: world-to-language shifts 
do not usually cause breakdowns in communication. Therefore, the presuppositions triggered 
by shifters must be accounted for in terms of binding or accommodation. Binding, however, 
is to be ruled out: the linguistic referent introduced by a shifter is new: it is not part of the 
common ground by the time the shifter is processed. Therefore, the prediction is that shifter-
triggered presuppositions are accommodated. Accommodation comes in when a 
                                                
12 I have talked of the expressions shifting reference from the world to language as anaphors, thus adopting John 
Ross’s terminology in a 1970 squib about metalinguistic anaphora, the first discussion of the topic known to 
me. Many writers, however, talk of discourse or textual deixis instead (e.g. Lyons 1977: 667; Webber 1988: 
116; Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 1460-61; Levinson 2004: 103, 108). I readily admit that there is a strong 
kinship between my data and deixis, especially the use of demonstrative NPs. Still, evidence seems to go both 
ways. (For some discussion, see De Brabanter 2004.) I cannot go into this issue here, but I rest content with the 
idea that there may be more similarities than differences between the two phenomena, a view for which 
Recanati (2005) makes a convincing case. 
13 In the rest of this section, I shall use the term shifter as a cover term (for expressions that host a shift in the 
universe of discourse), so as to leave the door open to a deixis-based account too. 
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presupposition that cannot be bound is nevertheless interpretable by the hearer. Let us take a 
simple example. A stranger comes up to me in the street and says: 
 
(32) I’ve lost my dog! Can you help me? 
 
Use of my triggers the presupposition that the man has a dog. But this cannot be bound to any 
information already in the common ground: the man is a perfect stranger to me. Yet, I have 
no trouble adding this information to the common ground. I ‘accommodate’ it, and no 
communication failure ensues. Now consider this other example: I hear a tremendously loud 
bang. A stranger turns to me and exclaims: 
 
(33) That sounded like an explosion. 
 
Her utterance is not accompanied by any demonstration. Although Beaver & Zeevat suggest 
that “the use of the demonstrative presupposes the demonstration by the speaker. If no such 
demonstration occurs, infelicity results: the reader cannot simply incorporate a referent” 
(2007: 535), I none the less assume that they would agree that accommodation still takes 
place provided a referent is salient enough in the situation of utterance. That is the case here 
given the loudness of the bang.14 
It is not clear that a similar story can be told about the presuppositions triggered by 
shifters. As pointed out in 4.2, there is no notable event foregrounding the intended linguistic 
referent, nothing like the loud bang in (33). This means that the Beaver/Zeevat account 
                                                
14 Ginzburg 2001: 21 has a similar example (his (24a)): 
[Context: a shot is heard, followed by a woman’s scream:] A: Oh boy, she sounds scared. 
Ginzburg’s comment is that “deixis makes anaphors felicitous without an overt antecedent” (2001: 21). But this 
is deixis without a demonstration.  
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predicts presupposition failure in most cases of world-to-language shift, a prediction that 
cannot be correct, because hearers generally have no trouble identifying the right referent. 
At this stage, the only way for a DRT-based account to address this issue is to introduce 
an extra layer of representation for speech events themselves,15 with special constraints 
designed to capture the short span of time during which uttered linguistic forms remain 
accessible. A step in this direction is taken by Corblin & Laborde (2001), in their study of the 
French counterparts of the former and the latter. Another such attempt, though not within 
DRT, is Ginzburg & Cooper’s (2004) HPSG formalisation of ‘clarification ellipsis’.16 
Ginzburg & Cooper focus on cases like A: Did Bo finagle a raise? B: finagle?, where B’s 
elliptical question is susceptible of either a ‘clausal reading’ (= Are you asking if Bo finagled 
a raise (of all actions)?) or a ‘constituent reading’ (= What does it mean to finagle?). They 
show that any model capable of accounting for examples of this kind must include several 
ingredients, two of which I will single out as they are directly relevant to an account of 
world-to-language anaphora. One ingredient is ‘utterance reference’. The idea is that 
clarification ellipsis – especially in its ‘constituent reading’ (which is often metalinguistic) – 
usually involves reference to utterance tokens (or ‘speech events’), so that the syntactic-
semantic representation of clarification ellipsis “must include references to (previously 
occurring) utterance events” (2004: 306). Note that this is exactly what is needed in the case 
of world-to-language anaphors. The second constraint is termed ‘sub-utterance accessibility’, 
and it originates in the observation that “any semantically meaningful sub-utterance can be 
clarified using [clarification ellipsis] under conditions of phonological or partial syntactic 
parallelism” (2004: 306). Once again, note that a similar constraint weighs upon any model 
of world-to-language anaphora: the antecedent of a shifted anaphor can be just any word or 
phrase in the close co-text. As a matter of fact, the constraint is stronger in the case of world-
                                                
15 Note that the difficulties highlighted in this section do not crop up with unshifted anaphors: these can be 
directly bound to an antecedent that refers to linguistic material. 
16 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for providing this reference. 
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to-language anaphora, because the antecedent need not even be a “semantically meaningful 
sub-utterance” (cf. examples (7) and (9), where the antecedent is not a referential expression). 
The provision of a formalised account of metalinguistic anaphora that includes utterance 
reference and sub-utterance accessibility is, at this stage of my research, no more than a 
promissory note. 
9. Conclusion 
The present study is in line with the earlier proposals of Gundel et al. (1993) and Ariel (1988, 
1991) in that it corroborates the idea that a cognitive principle underlies the choice of 
anaphoric expressions. However, though an important parameter, prior accessibility is not 
enough to explain what goes on in metalinguistic anaphora. Elsewhere, Wilson & Matsui 
(1998) have also shown that it is inadequate to account for other types of anaphora resolution. 
In the end, the main dividend of this study might be this: the very unobtrusiveness of 
world-to-language anaphors – the fact that their resolution does not pose special problems – 
throws light on what participants keep track of as a discourse (e.g. a conversation) proceeds. 
Psycholinguists have shown that discourse participants keep some record of which words 
were uttered.17 But here, we have direct linguistic rather than experimental psychological 
evidence of that assumption. Furthermore, speakers must to some extent be aware of what 
can be assumed to be in the minds of other participants. Otherwise, we should expect 
anaphora resolution to be a haphazard process. But it is not. The fact that it is often successful 
suggests that speakers assume other participants to temporarily store uttered linguistic forms 
over and above extralinguistic referents. It is likely that participants in a discourse 
                                                
17 See e.g. Levelt & Kelter (1982) or Levelt (1989). The idea is that, when planning a new utterance, speakers 
rely on the information stored in their ‘discourse record’ (Levelt 1989: 111) in order to make their new 
contribution coherent with previous moves. Levelt & Kelter adduce experimental evidence that lexical 
information is among those aspects of a discourse that are stored in short-term memory. 
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temporarily open mental files for linguistic entities too, for otherwise these could not serve as 
anchors for anaphoric expressions. 
Although this idea may appear quite commonsensical, it clashes with some views found 
in the literature. Thus, in a discussion of anaphoric pronouns, Mark Sainsbury writes:  
In the process of interpretation, we expect understanders to carry previous interpretations 
forward and for them thus to be available for solving new problems of interpretation. It would 
be quite another thing to expect them to carry forward memories of precise linguistic forms. It 
is a familiar phenomenon that among people who use two languages interchangeably in their 
conversations, it often happens that one remembers what the other said, but not in which 
language she said it. Interpretation is remembered, but not linguistic form. […] In interpreting 
the first part of, say, (1) (“A mosquito is buzzing about our room”) we come to know that 
what the speaker has said is true iff there is at least one mosquito which is buzzing around our 
room, and we throw away all other information about the utterance, including the words in 
which it was couched.  (2002: 57; emphasis mine) 
As far as I can see, the present study invalidates views of this sort. Sainsbury is certainly right 
in assuming that propositional contents are usually remembered much longer than the 
linguistic material used to convey them. But he fails to allow for the difference between 
effects on long-term and on short-term memory. What Saka calls multiple ostension has a 
short-lived impact. The various linguistic aspects associated to an uttered token are only kept 
in mind for a while; long enough, however, to enable the hearer to interpret successfully a 
subsequent shifted anaphor, provided this anaphor occurs while the ostended items are still 
stored in short-term memory. 
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